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Abstract
We describe and evaluate an attack that reconstructs the histogram of any target attribute of a
sensitive dataset which can only be queried through a specific class of real-world privacy-preserving
algorithms which we call bounded perturbation algorithms. A defining property of such an algorithm
is that it perturbs answers to the queries by adding zero-mean noise distributed within a bounded
(possibly undisclosed) range. Other key properties of the algorithm include only allowing restricted
queries (enforced via an online interface), suppressing answers to queries which are only satisfied by a
small group of individuals (e.g., by returning a zero as an answer), and adding the same perturbation
to two queries which are satisfied by the same set of individuals (to thwart differencing or averaging
attacks). A real-world example of such an algorithm is the one deployed by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics’ (ABS) online tool called TableBuilder, which allows users to create tables, graphs and maps
of Australian census data [30]. We assume an attacker (say, a curious analyst) who is given oracle access
to the algorithm via an interface. We describe two attacks on the algorithm. Both attacks are based
on carefully constructing (different) queries that evaluate to the same answer. The first attack finds
the hidden perturbation parameter r (if it is assumed not to be public knowledge). The second attack
removes the noise to obtain the original answer of some (counting) query of choice. We also show how
to use this attack to find the number of individuals in the dataset with a target attribute value a of any
attribute A, and then for all attribute values ai ∈ A. None of the attacks presented here depend on
any background information. Our attacks are a practical illustration of the (informal) fundamental law
of information recovery which states that “overly accurate estimates of too many statistics completely
destroys privacy” [9, 15].
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1 Introduction
We consider online privacy-preserving algorithms that return noisy answers to queries on sensitive data,
where the zero-mean noise is strictly bounded between an interval parameterised by a perturbation parameter.
Our focus is restricted to algorithms that (privately) answer counting queries. An example counting query
is: “How many people in the dataset are aged 25 and live in the suburb of Redfern in New South Wales,
Australia?” An example of such privacy-preserving algorithms is the perturbation algorithm employed by
the TableBuilder tool from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), which allows access to the Australian
population census data.1 We shall call this algorithm the TBE algorithm named after its authors [30]. The
TBE algorithm and similar bounded perturbation algorithms are built on certain principles to address privacy
and utility concerns, outlined below.
• Access to sensitive data is only allowed through a restricted query interface. This limits the types
of queries that can be executed via the underlying (privacy-preserving) algorithm, therefore minimiz-
ing information leakage by ensuring that the (effective) query language is not rich enough. A rich
query language would require query auditing to ensure privacy; such auditing may not even be pro-
grammable [14].
• The noise added to the queries is bounded within a predetermined range, say ±3 of the actual answer.
From a privacy angle this adds uncertainty if the (adversarial) analyst is trying to run a query on
certain attributes in the dataset to infer some information about a target individual. From a utility
point of view, the bounded noise ensures that the noise never overwhelms the true statistics.
• The algorithm suppresses low non-zero counts (e.g., by returning 0). This makes it hard for an analyst
to know if certain characteristics (combination of attributes or fields in the dataset) are shown by its
target individual(s) or not. For instance, a 0 count could be an actual 0 or a 1 in the original dataset.
1See http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder. At the time of this writing, there are three
flavours of TableBuilder. The first two are TableBuilder Basic & Pro, which require registration (the latter being a charged
product). After the registration request is approved, the user can login to use the TableBuilder tool. The third flavour is for
guests, called TableBuilder Guest. This can be accessed by users without registration and provides access to fewer variables
from the census data. The attacks mentioned in this paper are applicable to all flavours.
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• The algorithm adds the exact same noise if the answers returned by two queries are contributed by the
same set of contributors. A contributor to a query is any individual that satisfies the query. This is
a defence against averaging attacks [19], where the analyst cannot pose multiple, possibly differently
structured, queries with the same set of contributors to reduce noise by averaging to find the true
count.
Contributions. We show an attack that retrieves the entire histogram of a target attribute from a dataset
which can only be queried through the TBE algorithm.2 Our attack relies on carefully constructing queries
that yield the same (true) answer and averaging them over all queries to eliminate noise. Furthermore, in
cases where it may be argued that the perturbation parameter is not public information, we show an attack
that retrieves the exact (hidden) perturbation parameter. We remark that the attacks presented do not
depend on any background knowledge about individuals in the dataset, i.e., they are dataset independent,
and hence applicable to any underlying dataset.3 We discuss several mitigation measures, and argue that
the most sound strategy is to add noise as a function of the number of queries. This follows from the bound
on the success probability of our attack, and is consistent with the amount of noise required via the notion
of differential privacy [11].
Results. For both attacks, i.e., finding the hidden perturbation and removing noise, we derive exact
expressions for the success probabilities as a function of the perturbation parameter and the number of
queries to the algorithm. We also evaluate the noise removing attack on a synthetic dataset queried through
an API to the TBE algorithm. Our results (both theoretical and experimental) show that any perturbation
parameter less than or equal to 10 can be retrieved with probability ≈ 0.90 with only up to 1,000 queries.
Furthermore, we are able to recover a smaller perturbation parameter (5), which is desirable for utility,
with only 200 queries with a probability of more than 0.95. Using the same API, with the perturbation
parameter 2, we retrieve an entire histogram of a target column of the synthetic dataset with more than 107
attribute values through only 400 queries per attribute value (via the noise removing attack). The attack
also successfully retrieves suppressed counts (low counts returned as 0), and hence distinguishes between
actual zeros and suppressed zeros.
Application to the ABS TableBuilder. Our use of the API to query the TBE algorithm simulates
the setting of the ABS TableBuilder tool providing access to the Australian census data. The TableBuilder
tool does not currently have a programmable API, and can only be accessed via a web interface. The
attack in practice can still be launched by either manually querying TableBuilder to construct tables or
more realistically, by crafting web queries through scripts to directly query the JavaScript programs behind
the web interface. We chose to use the simulated setting for a quicker illustration of the attack and more
importantly due to ethical considerations; the census data being highly sensitive.
Privacy Implications of Our Attacks. Our main attack removes noise in the answers returned by the
TBE algorithm. This is specifically problematic for low counts, e.g., counts of 1. For instance, assume
that there is a single individual in the dataset gendered male and within age bracket 30-39 who lives in
the suburb Newtown. Since the true answer is 1, TBE will return the suppressed answer 0. Our attack
enables the analyst to retrieve the true count 1 by cleverly constructing queries that return larger counts
(cf. Section 4.2.2). Once the true count is revealed, the analyst having the background knowledge (male,
30-39, Newtown) can successfully re-identify the person in the dataset. Thus, true counts enable other
privacy attacks such as re-identification and inference (cf. Section 2.2). Note that it is to avoid such
attacks that the TBE algorithms employs the aforementioned principles to hide true counts. We remark
that some international government agencies such as Statistics Sweden have expressed interest in the use
of TableBuilder for disclosure control of frequency tables [27, 2], although it is acknowledged that further
evaluation of the technique is necessary [2]. Moreover, there are plans to expand the use of TableBuilder to
other Australian national government agencies and datasets. Thus our results have implications beyond the
ABS use of TableBuilder.
2An example of an attribute is ‘Age’, and its histogram is the number of people of each age.
3Barring a few mild assumptions on the domain of the dataset, e.g., the existence of an attribute with more than 2 attribute
values (Section 4.1).
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2 Preliminaries
We model the database D as a set of rows of data, each belonging to a unique individual from a finite set
of individuals U . Thus, the size of the dataset is the same as the size of the set U , i.e., |D| = |U |. The data
from an individual u ∈ U is represented as a row x ∈ D. We denote the link by x = data(u). The row x is
a member of some domain D.
2.1 Definitions: Queries and Contributors
Definition 1 (Query). A query q : D→ {0, 1} is defined as a predicate on the rows x ∈ D. Note that this
is in fact the definition of a counting query. The queries in this document are restricted to counting queries.
The query’s result on the dataset D is defined as q(D) =
∑
x∈D q(x). For any two queries q1 and q2, we
denote by q1 ∧ q2 the predicate that evaluates to 1 on a row if and only if both q1 and q2 evaluate to 1 on
the row. Likewise we denote by q1 ∨ q2 the predicate that evaluates to 1 if either q1 or q2, or both evaluate
to 1.
We will often omit the argument of q, i.e., D, since we are concerned with a single dataset in this
document.
Definition 2 (Contributors). A contributor of a query q is any individual u ∈ U such that q(x) = 1, where
x = data(u). The set of contributors of a query q, denoted C(q) is defined as
C(q) = {u ∈ U : q(x) = 1, where x = data(u)}
Two queries q1 and q2 are said to have the same contributors if C(q1) = C(q2). Otherwise they are said to
have different contributors.
Note that having different contributors does not mean that C(q1) and C(q2) are necessarily disjoint. Fur-
thermore, it is possible for two different queries (different predicates) q1 and q2 to have the same contributors
(depending on the dataset). We assume the dataset D to be vertically divided into attributes. Let A denote
one such attribute, and let |A| denote its cardinality, i.e., the number of attribute values of A. Let a ∈ A
be an attribute value. We assume that the data of each u ∈ U takes on only one value from A. The query
qa is defined as the predicate which evaluates to 1 if the row has value a under A. Let A
′ ⊆ A, then qA′ is
defined as qA′ = ∨a∈A′(qa). We shall call this query, the total query, as it returns the total number of counts
that satisfy each of the attribute values a ∈ A′. We also denote the trivial query q∅, which evaluates to 1 on
every row. Hence q∅(D) = n. Also, note that qA(D) = n for every attribute A of D. Clearly, in both cases
the set of contributors is the entire user set U .
Table 1: An example database D with |U | = 6 users.
U Suburb Age Gender
1 Redfern 20-29 M
2 Redfern 20-29 M
3 Newtown 30-39 F
4 Redfern 20-29 F
5 Surry Hills 40-49 M
6 Darlinghurst 70-79 F
Example 1. Table 1 shows a dataset D with 6 users. We have three different attributes: Suburb, Age and
Gender. The attribute U is just shown for illustrative purposes. It is otherwise forbidden to be queried.
The attribute Suburb has 4 attribute values, Age has 5 attribute values and Gender has 2 attribute values.
Queries qRedfern and q20-29 both evaluate to 3. Also note that C(qRedfern) = C(q20-29) = {1, 2, 4}, and thus
the two queries have the same set of contributors. On the other hand, C(qRedfern) 6= C(qM). We have
(qRedfern ∧ qM)(D) = 2, and (qRedfern ∨ qM)(D) = 4. Let A′ = {Redfern,Newtown}. Then the total query
qA′(D) has answer 4.
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2.2 Background on Privacy Attacks
We briefly describe some known categories of privacy attacks. For ease, we assume a database D with n
users and three attributes U , A and B. As in Table 1, U represented unique user identities. We can further
assume A to be the attribute Suburb, and B to be the attribute Age in the database of this table. Queries
q are defined on D as in the previous section. We assume that the database can be queried via a mechanism
M only, which is possibly randomized. To define the various attacks, we shall take example mechanismsM.
We first assume an adversary who has some background knowledge of some user u ∈ U . In particular, the
adversary knows that the user has some attribute value a ∈ A. Consider a mechanismM which simply strips
the attribute U and releases exact answers to queries on attribute A and/or B. Suppose qa(D) = 1, i.e., only
one individual takes on a ∈ A in the dataset D. Then this mechanism is susceptible to a re-identification
attack. The adversary knowing a ∈ A has re-identified u’s data in the database. The adversary can further
launch an inference attack by asking the queries qa∧qb for all b ∈ B, thus inferring what value is taken by the
user u in the attribute B. It is usually argued that for re-identification to be successful the attribute a should
also be unique in the population, and not just in the dataset. However, if the attribute A is replaced with
a large enough set of attributes as background knowledge, then the resulting attribute-value tuple is likely
to be unique in the population as well [29]. Thus, any mechanism that returns exact answers is susceptible
to re-identification attacks. We also note that the success of the inference attack is not necessarily tied to
successful re-identification. Indeed, qa(D) might be greater than 1, but the adversary can still ask the queries
qa ∧ qb for all b ∈ B and learn which values b are not taken by its target.
To mitigate re-identification, we can redefine the mechanism to suppress low counts: any query answer less
than a suppression parameter s ≥ 0 is clipped to 0. However, this mechanism is susceptible to a differencing
attack. The adversary defines the subset A′ = A−{a}, asks the queries qA and qA′ , and subtracts the answer
to the second query from the first. If both qA(D) and qA′(D) are greater than s, then the difference in the
two answers reveals qa(D). To thwart the differencing attack, we can design a mechanismM which, instead
of suppression, perturbs all answers by adding fresh random noise from the set {−1, 0, 1}. In this case, the
attacker can launch an averaging attack. In particular, the attacker asks for the answer of qa a total of t
times, and then averages the answers. With increasing t, the probability that the average deviates from the
true answer approaches 0. A solution is to add the same noise if the same query is asked again, or if the
same contributors satisfy the query, as is done, for instance, in the TBE algorithm.
Yet another form of attack is database reconstruction, where the adversary reconstructs a target column of
a dataset, e.g., corresponding to attribute A. In other words, the adversary attempts to exactly retrieve the
values taken by each user under A in the dataset. The database reconstruction attacks in the literature [16,
9, 12, 24, 7] require some form of queries that can select rows corresponding to different subsets of users U .
An example of such queries are subset sum queries. Previous work shows that any mechanism that returns
noisy answers to subset sum queries where the noise scale is bounded by a constant is susceptible to database
reconstruction attacks. Alternatively, the attack can be launched by using a set of attributes (instead of U)
such that each user in the dataset takes a unique attribute-value tuple in the dataset. See [16, §3] for more
details.
Our main proposed attack is an averaging attack, which in combination with a differencing attack, results
in a histogram reconstruction attack. Namely, For any given a ∈ A, we construct exact answers to the queries
qa ∧ qb, for all b ∈ B. It is not clear how a database reconstruction attack can be launched on the TBE
algorithm, as its query interface is very restrictive.
3 Privacy Algorithms
Our focus is on a particular privacy algorithm (mechanism) that returns (perturbed) answers to queries q
on the database D, where the queries are as defined in Definition 1. We call the algorithm the Bounded
Noisy Counts algorithm. The algorithm returns the answer to a query q by adding bounded noise e from
the uniform distribution over the set of integers in the interval [−r, r], where r is some positive integer, i.e.,
the perturbation parameter. We shall denote the set of integers in [−r, r] by Z±r and the (discrete) uniform
distribution over Z±r by U±r. The algorithm also has two exceptional cases:
1. If the answer to q is less than a suppression parameter s ≥ r, then the answer returned is exactly 0.
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2. If two queries q1 and q2 have the same contributors, then the noise e added to the two queries is the
same.
The algorithm therefore is a stateful algorithm where the state consists of a dictionary of subsets of contrib-
utors and the corresponding noise. We denote this algorithm by Mr,s and on any input query q denote its
output as Mr,s(q). The algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. We remark that the noise distribution can
be any admissible distribution, which we define in Section 6. Bounded uniform random noise is one example.
Input: The query q, perturbation parameter r, suppression parameter s ≥ r.
State : A noise dictionary, denoted nd, with keys from subsets of U and values in Z±r.
1 Evaluate C(q) and let n = q(D).
2 if n ≤ s then
3 return 0.
4 else
5 if C(q) ∈ nd then
6 obtain noise e← nd(C(q)).
7 return n+ e.
8 else
9 sample e ∼ U±r.
10 add entry nd(C(q)) = e.
11 return n+ e.
Algorithm 1: The Bounded Noisy Counts Algorithm Mr,s.
From now on, we shall drop the subscripts r and s, and denote the algorithm simply as M. Following
properties are direct consequences of the algorithm.
Proposition 1. Let α←M(q) be the answer returned by M on some query q. Let n = q(D). Then
(a) α ≥ 0,
(b) n− s ≤ α ≤ n+ r.
(c) If α > 0 then C(q) 6= ∅.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above algorithm is used as a subroutine by another algorithm which we call the Attribute Analyser.
This algorithm helps the querier analyse multiple attribute values under an attribute at once. Let B denote
a tuple of (one or more) attributes in D. Let b ∈ B denote the vector of attribute values whose ith entry is
one of the attribute values of the ith attribute in B. Let qb denote the predicate that evaluates to 1 if and
only if the row satisfies all values in b. This models a target sub-population in the dataset D. The Attribute
Analyser takes an attribute value vector b ∈ B, and a subset of attribute values A′ ⊆ A, where A /∈ B.
Let |A′| = m. The algorithm then runs M on (i) each of the queries qb ∧ qai where ai ∈ A′, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
obtaining answers αi, and (ii) on the total query qb ∧ qA′ , obtaining the answer αA′ . It then returns the
answer vector (α1, . . . , αm, αA′).
Input: Attribute value vector b ∈ B, attribute subset A′ ⊆ A of cardinality m (where A /∈ B).
1 for i = 1 to m do
2 Let ai be the ith element in A
′.
3 Obtain αi ←M(qb ∧ qai).
4 Obtain αA′ ←M(qb ∧ qA′).
5 return (α1, . . . , αm, αA′).
Algorithm 2: The Attribute Analyser Algorithm.
Note that A′ can be possibly empty, in which case qA′ = q∅, and the algorithm returns the answer to
qb ∧ q∅ = qb only. Likewise, B can be possibly empty, meaning that qb = q∅, in which case we are analysing
A′ over the whole dataset D (rather than over a sub-population).
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Example 2. Consider the dataset from Table 1. Let B = (Suburb,Gender). Furthermore, let b ∈ B be
(Redfern,M). Thus, we are interested in the sub-population of people who are male and living in the suburb
of Redfern in the dataset. Thus qb = qRedfern ∧ qM. Let A = Age, and A′ ⊆ A be {20-29, 30-39}. Then α1
corresponds to qb∧q20-29 (true answer 2), α2 corresponds to qb∧q30-39 (true answer 0), and αA′ corresponds
to qb ∧ qA′ = (qb ∧ q20-29) ∨ (qb ∧ q30-39) (true answer 2). If on the other hand, we have B = Suburb
and b = Redfern, A = Gender and A′ = {M,F}, then we get (qb ∧ qM)(D) = 2, (qb ∧ qF)(D) = 1, and
(qb ∧ qA′)(D) = 3. Note that C(qb ∧ qM) 6= C(qb ∧ qF) 6= C(qb ∧ qA′). Thus, M would add fresh noise values
to each of these true counts. If the suppression parameter s is set to 1, then the answer to qb ∧ qF would be
fixed to 0.
4 Privacy Attacks
We assume an attacker (say, a curious analyst) who is given oracle access to the Attribute Analyser (which in
turn uses the Bounded Noisy Counts algorithm as a subroutine). The attacker does not know the parameter
r. We describe two attacks on the algorithm. The first attack finds the hidden perturbation parameter r.
The second attack removes the noise to obtain the original count n = q(D) of some query of choice q. We
also show how to use this attack to obtain the value qa(D) for some target attribute value a ∈ A, and then
for all attribute values a ∈ A. We reiterate that none of the attacks depend on any background information.
For simplicity, we assume that s = r. Our fundamental unit of measurement will be the number of queries
t submitted to the Bounded Noisy Counts algorithm.
4.1 Attack 1: Finding the Perturbation Parameter r
Let b ∈ B be an attribute value and let A 6= B be an attribute with only two attribute values a1 and a2, e.g.,
the Gender attribute with values male and female. Let n = qb(D), n1 = (qb∧qa1)(D) and n2 = (qb∧qa2)(D).
Consider the sequence of inputs (b, {a1}), (b, {a2}) and (b, ∅) to the Attribute Analyser. As output, we obtain
n1+e1, n2+e2 and n+e3, where ei are the noise terms added by Bounded Noisy Counts. Clearly, n = n1+n2.
Furthermore,
Lemma 1. If n1, n2 > r, then e1, e2 and e3 are independent samples from the distribution U±r.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Let b1, . . . , bm be different attribute values from one or more attributes. If M(qbi) 6= M(qbj )
then C(qbi) 6= C(qbj ), for all i, j ∈ [m], i 6= j.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now, define the random variable
Z = (n1 + E1) + (n2 + E2)− (n+ E3) = E1 + E2 − E3 (1)
where Ei are i.i.d. random variables with distribution U±r. Since Ei ≤ r, we have Z ≤ 3r, which would
happen if E1 = E2 = r and E3 = −r. Our attack can be summarised as follows:
1. Find an attribute A with only two attribute values a1 and a2 (e.g., gender).
2. Find m different attribute values b1, . . . , bm from any number of attributes such thatM(qbi ∧ qa1) and
M(qbi ∧ qa2) are greater than 0 implying that M(qbi) > 0. This ensures the condition of Lemma 1.
Furthermore, ensure that the contributors of all queries qbi are different. Lemma 2 shows how to ensure
this.
3. For the ith attribute value (bi) obtain zi which is an instance of the random variable Z in Eq. 1.
4. Let zmax be the maximum of the m values. We then return d zmax3 e as the guess for r.
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Input: m distinct attribute values b1, . . . , bm, attribute A of cardinality 2 with attributes a1 and a2,
all satisfying M(qbi ∧ qa1),M(qbi ∧ qa2) > 0 and M(qbi) 6=M(qbj ), for i, j ∈ [m], i 6= j.
1 Set zmin ←∞ and zmax ← −∞.
2 for i = 1 to m do
3 Run Attribute Analyzer with inputs (bi, {a1}), (bi, {a2}) and (bi, ∅) and get outputs z1, z2 and z3,
respectively.
4 Set z = z1 + z2 − z3.
5 if z > zmax then
6 zmax ← z.
7 if z < zmin then
8 zmin ← z.
9 Let r′ = max{−d zmin3 e, d zmax3 e}.
10 Output r′.
Algorithm 3: The Perturbation Finder Algorithm.
We can in fact do better by also keeping track of the minimum values. Let zmin be the minimum of the
m values. Notice that Z ≥ −3r. Our guess for r is then max{−d zmin3 e, d zmax3 e}. The guess for r would
be correct as long as either −zmin or zmax is greater than 3(r − 1). The exact algorithm is described in
Algorithm 3.
We will show that the algorithm returns the correct perturbation r with high probability, depending on
a suitable choice for m.
Lemma 3. Let r ≥ 1, and let E1, E2 and E3 be variables that take values in Z±r. Out of the (2r + 1)3
possible values of the tuple (E1, E2, E3), there are precisely 20 that satisfy E1 + E2 + E3 > 3(r − 1) or
E1 + E2 + E3 < −3(r − 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Let r′ be the output of Perturbation Finder. Then
Pr[r′ = r] = 1−
(
1− 20
(2r + 1)3
)m
Proof. See Appendix A.
For a given probability of success, larger perturbations require more queries to M (through the Pertur-
bation Finder algorithm). However, note that larger values of r are not desirable from a utility point of
view. For each attribute value, the Attribute Analyser makes 3 calls to Bounded Noisy Counts M. Thus,
for a total of m attributes we have t = 3m queries to M. Figure 1 shows the number of queries t required
for a given probability of success. Note that smaller values of r, i.e., ≤ 5, which are desirable from a utility
point of view need less than t = 600 for a 95% success rate.
Remark 1. We have assumed for simplicity that A is an attribute with exactly two attribute values. In
general, the attack is applicable to any attribute with at least two attribute values. In this case, we run the
Attribute Analyser with inputs corresponding to the two selected attribute values, plus the input (bi, A
′).
Remark 2. Again for simplicity, in the ith iteration of Algorithm 3, we run the Attribute Analyser on three
different inputs. These can be replaced by a single input (bi, A
′), where A′ = {a1, a2} ⊆ A. The output of
Attribute Analyser will by definition return (noisy) answers to the queries qb ∧ qa1 , qb ∧ qa2 and qb ∧ qA′
as desired (step 5 of Algorithm 2). Thus, while this constitutes 3 queries to Bounded Noisy Counts, this
is only a single query to the Attribute Analyser. The latter resembles the TableBuilder tool interface. The
results summarised in Section 1 are with respect to the Attribute Analyser, which simulates the TableBuilder
interface.
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Figure 1: Probability of successfully finding the perturbation parameter r as a function of the number of
queries t to Bounded Noisy Counts in the Perturbation Finder algorithm. Higher perturbations require a
much larger number of attribute values m (and hence number of queries).
4.2 Attack 2: Removing Noise
Consider again a tuple of attributes B (possibly empty) from D, and let b ∈ B denote a vector of attribute
values from B defined as before. Consider an attribute A with m attribute values a1, . . . , am. In this section,
we will show an attack that finds the exact answer to qb∧qA by using the Attribute Analyzer as a black box.
We will then show how to use this algorithm to find the true answer to any target query qb∧qai . Continuing
on, we can find the true answers to all queries qb ∧ qai , i ∈ [m]. We will first assume that M(qb ∧ qai) 6= 0
for all i, for simplicity. Later on we will show that this assumption can be relaxed as long as we have some
m′ < m attributes from A satisfying M(qb ∧ qai) 6= 0.
We begin with a simple observation on A. Recall that a two-partition of a set A is a partition of A with
exactly two subsets of A.
Lemma 4. There are exactly 2m−1 − 1 two-partitions of the set A.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We will let PA denote the set of all two-partitions of A. The following result shows that all sets in PA
have different contributors.
Lemma 5. Assume M(qb ∧ qai) 6= 0, for all i ∈ [m]. Let A be a two-partition in PA, and let A′ ∈ A be any
of the two sets in A. Let A′′ be either the other set in A or any of the two sets from any other partition in
PA. Then, C(qb ∧ qA′) 6= C(qb ∧ qA′′).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Example 3. Consider the dataset in Table 1. Let A = Suburb. Then A has m = 4 attribute values: D =
Darlinghurst, N = Newtown, R = Redfern and S = Surry Hills. The 2m−1 − 1 = 7 two-partitions of A are
as follows:
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A1 {D} {N} {R} {S} {D, N} {D, R} {D, S}
A2 {N, R, S} {D, R, S} {D, N, S} {D, N, R} {R, S} {N, S} {N, R}
Let B = ∅ and hence b = ∅. Then qb ∧ qai = qai for all ai ∈ A, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Also, from Table 1,
C(qai) 6= ∅, for all ai ∈ A. Let A′ be any of the 14 sets in the table above, and let A′′ 6= A′ be any of the
remaining 13 sets. Then, according to Lemma 5, C(qA′) 6= C(qA′′). One can easily verify through Table 1
that this is indeed true.
Let n = |C(qb)| = |C(qb ∧ qA)|, which we seek to find through the attack. Consider a partition {A1, A2}
in PA, and note that (qb ∧ qA1)(D) + (qb ∧ qA2)(D) = n. Now consider the queries (b, A1) and (b, A2) to
the Attribute Analyser. In return, among other answers, we get αA1 and αA2 , which are the noisy answers
to the two (total) queries mentioned above. Adding the two, we have z = n+ e1 + e2, where e1 and e2 are
unknown error terms from Z±r. Our attack is as follows: for each of the k = 2m−1 − 1 partitions in PA,
query the Attribute Analyser with the two sets in the partition, add the answers, and average them over all
k. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.
Input: A vector of attribute values b ∈ B, attribute A with m different attribute values and set PA
of two-partitions of A.
1 Initualize z ← 0.
2 for each two-partition {A1, A2} in PA do
3 Query the Attribute Analyzer with inputs (b, A1) and (b, A2) and obtain αA1 and αA2 .
4 Update z ← z + αA1 + αA2 .
5 Let k = 2m−1 − 1 and obtain z ← z/k.
6 Output bze.
Algorithm 4: The Noise Remover Algorithm.
Notice that in each loop the Attribute Analyser queries Bounded Noisy CountsM twice. Therefore there
are a total of t = 2k = 2m − 2 queries to M.
4.2.1 Success Probability
Let Zi denote the random variable denoting the sum in Step 4 of the algorithm for the ith partition, where
i ∈ [k], k = 2m−1 − 1. We have
Zi = n+ E
(i)
1 + E
(i)
2 , (2)
where E
(i)
1 and E
(i)
2 are the noise variables.
Lemma 6. For each i ∈ [k], E(i)1 and E(i)2 are i.i.d. random variables with distribution U±r. Furthermore,
Z1, . . . , Zk as defined by Eq. 2 are i.i.d. random variables.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now define Z = 1k
∑k
i=1 Zi. The success probability of the Noise Remover is then given by Pr
(∣∣Z − n∣∣ < 0.5).
Define Yi = E
(i)
1 + E
(i)
2 and Y =
1
k
∑k
i=1 Yi.Then
Pr
(∣∣Z − n∣∣ < 0.5) = Pr(∣∣∣∣∣Y + 1k
k∑
i=1
n− n
∣∣∣∣∣ < 0.5
)
= Pr
(∣∣Y ∣∣ < 0.5)
Thus, we will attempt to find Pr
(∣∣Y ∣∣ < 0.5). We will first show a lower bound on this probability and then
an exact expression.
Lower Bound on the Success Probability. Using Chebyshev’s inequality, we see that
Pr
(∣∣Y − E(Y )∣∣ ≥ ) ≤ Var(Y )
2
. (3)
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By setting  = 0.5, and putting in k = 2m−1 − 1, and the values of E(Y ) and Var(Y ) (see Appendix A.1),
we get
Pr
(∣∣Y ∣∣ < 0.5) ≥ 1− 8r(r + 1)
3(2m−1 − 1) . (4)
Figure 2 shows lower bounds on the success probabilities against different perturbation parameters as a
function of t = 2k, i.e., the number of queries to Bounded Noisy Counts.
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Figure 2: Lower bounds on the probability of successfully retrieving the actual count n = (qb ∧ qA)(D)
through the Noise Remover algorithm. Here m = 12 and hence t = 2k ranges from 2 to 2(2m−1− 1) = 4094.
Remark 3. Figure 2 shows that we do not need to use all the two-partitions in PA to achieve a given
probability of success. Furthermore, since each iteration calls the Attribute Analyser twice (one for each
partition), we have a total of 2k calls to Attribute Analyser. Thus, if we were to run this algorithm on the
TBE algorithm via the TableBuilder tool, this would require running the tool a total of 2k times.
Exact Success Probability. Consider the sum
∑k
i=1E
(i)
1 + E
(i)
2 . Simplifying notation, we can view this
as the sum of 2k i.i.d. random variables Ei (due to Lemma 6). The probability mass function of each Ei is
given by
fE(x) =
{
1
2r+1 if x ∈ Z±r
0 otherwise
.
In Appendix A.2, we show that
Pr
(∣∣Y ∣∣ < 0.5) = ∑
x∈(−k/2,k/2)
fX2k(x), (5)
where X2k is the sum of 2k i.i.d. random variables Ei. Thus, we can evaluate Eq. 5 to find the exact success
probability of the Noise Remover algorithm to obtain the answer n = (qb ∧ qA)(D). Figure 3 shows these
success probabilities. Comparing this with Figure 2, we see that the actual success probability is higher for
much smaller values of t = 2k.
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Figure 3: Probability of successfully retrieving the actual count n = (qb∧qA)(D) through the Noise Remover
algorithm. Here t = 2k ranges from 2 to 2000.
4.2.2 Broadening the Scope of Attack 2
We now show that our attack can be used much more broadly.
Relaxing the Non-Zero Outputs Assumption. We assumed in the previous section that all m attribute
values of A satisfy M(qb ∧ qai) 6= 0, i ∈ [m]. First note from Figure 3 that we do not need all the two-
partitions of A to find qb ∧ qA. The only requirement is to have a sufficient number of two-partitions t
to “average out” n. Thus, as long as we have m′ ≤ m number of attribute values whose corresponding
queries have non-zero answers (via Bounded Noisy Counts), we can use them to find the answer to the
aforementioned query in the following way. Let a1, . . . , am′ , am′+1, . . . , am denote the m attribute values
of A, and assume (w.l.o.g.) that only upto am′ have M(qb ∧ qai) > 0. Therefore M(qb ∧ qai) is 0 for all
m′ < i ≤ m. Let A′′ denote the set of attribute values am′+1, . . . , am. Note that C(qb∧ qA′′) can be possibly
empty. We first construct all two-partitions of the set A′ = A − A′′, resulting in 2m′−1 − 1 two-partitions.
Denote this by PA′ . Then in each two-partition we add A
′′ to any one (but not both) of the two sets in the
partition. It is easy to see that the resulting set is a set of two-partitions of A (not necessarily the set of
all two-partitions of A). Furthermore, we still ensure that Lemma 6 holds. For, if C(qb ∧ qA′′) is empty,
then Lemma 6 automatically holds due to construction of PA′ . On the other hand, if C(qb ∧ qA′′) is not
empty, then we are adding a set of new contributors which are not in A′. Adding these contributors means
that Bounded Noisy Counts adds fresh noise to the corresponding query (on the particular set in the given
two-partition in which A′′ is added). Thus, Lemma 6 follows due to Lemma 5 in this case. We shall call A′
a subset of A with non-zero answers.
Removing the Noise on a Target Attribute Value. Let us now assume that we are interested to know
the value qb ∧ qa for some target attribute value a in A. We take a subset A′ of A with non-zero answers
such that a /∈ A′. We first run the Noise Remover on the set of two-partitions PA′ of A′, obtaining count
n′. We then construct PA′∪{a}, and run the Noise Remover algorithm again to obtain the count as n′′. The
answer to the above query is then n′′ − n′. If M(qb ∧ qa) = 0 then we can use the trick mentioned above
to construct two-partitions of A′ ∪ {a}. Let pnr denote the probability of success of Noise Remover. Then,
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through a simple application of the union bound, the success probability is given by 1 − 2(1 − pnr). This
requires around 2(2k) = 4k calls to the Attribute Analyser, and hence t = 4k calls to Bounded Noisy Counts.
Removing the Noise on the Attribute Histogram. Continuing on with the previous example we can
in fact find answers to qb ∧ qai corresponding to all m attributes of A. We first construct a subset A′ of
A with non-zero answers (with m′ number of attributes), and use Noise Remover once to find qb ∧ qA′ .
For any attribute a ∈ A − A′ we follow the methodology defined above to retrieve the answer. Thus, a
further m − m′ calls to the Noise Remover. On the other hand, for any target attribute value a′ ∈ A′,
we run the Noise Remover on two-partitions of A′ − {a′} (instead of A′ ∪ {a′} = A′). This means a
further m′ calls to the Noise Remover. By the union bound, the overall probability of success is given by
1− (m−m′+1+m′)(1−pnr) = 1− (m+1)(1−pnr). This requires 2k(m+1) calls to the Attribute Analyser,
and hence 2k(m + 1) queries to Bounded Noisy Counts. Figure 4 shows the success probability in finding
all queries corresponding to all attribute values in some target attribute A. Here we have used k = 800
(t = 1600), and thus |A′| has to be ≥ 12. Recall that k cannot be greater than 2m′−1 − 1. While m′ = 11
would suffice to find all attribute values in A − A′, we require m′ = 12 so that we can find the attribute
values within A′ as well. Note that this result is obtained through the union bound, and the actual success
probability is likely to be much better.
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Figure 4: Probability of successfully retrieving all actual counts of the queries (qb ∧ qai)(D) of an attribute
A with m different attribute values. Here k = 800 and hence t = 1600.
5 Experimental Evaluation on the TBE Algorithm
5.1 Synthetic Dataset
We ran Attack 2 on a synthetic dataset accessed via an API built on top of the TBE algorithm. The API
mimics the functionality of the TableBuilder tool from ABS. Our privacy algorithms represent an abstract
mathematical model of the TBE algorithm. As such there is one significant simplification used in our
mathematical model that needs specific mention. Since the TBE algorithm is meant to answer queries on-
the-fly, it maintains a pre-computed table of noise (instead of freshly generated noise for queries with a new
set of contributors). Since the number of queries can be much larger than the dimension of the table, a
13
Table 2: Results of running Attack 2 to retrieve a target column of the synthetic dataset. Cells labeled *
means that some instances had negative counts which were floored to 0. There were four such instances for
k = 50, and one instance for k = 127. In all cases the returned count was −1.
Count (c)
True Total Correctly Retrieved
Instances k = 50 k = 127 k = 200 k = 255
c = 0 56 55∗ 56∗ 56 56
0 < c ≤ 4 (suppressed) 6 6 6 6 6
4 < c ≤ 100 8 8 7 8 8
100 < c ≤ 44865 37 34 37 37 37
Total 107 104 106 107 107
Success Percentage - 97.2% 99.1% 100% 100%
mechanism is introduced that deterministically accesses the relevant noise entry in the table. The entries in
the table are themselves derived from an admissible distribution that maximises entropy subject to utility
constraints [26]. In the next section (Section 6), we show that the discrete uniform distribution over Z±r is
one such distribution, and any other choice of admissible distribution is still susceptible to our attack. Thus,
the cells in the table of noise can be safely assumed to be uniform random entries from Z±r. To ensure that
same contributors receive the same noise, the contributors (users) in the dataset are assigned unique keys.
When combining different contributors, the keys are XORed and then given as input to a pseudo-random
number generator which in turn maps it to a perturbed value in the table [20, 26]. We see that with a big
enough perturbation table, our model is a good approximation. As we shall see, the results of our attack
confirms this. The aforementioned API uses the perturbation parameter r = 2. Furthermore, it returns the
output “suppressed” for counts of ≤ 4. However, for the sake of our attack, we assume that the returned
count is 0 (which is a more difficult problem).
We fix a target attribute in the synthetic dataset. The attribute has 107 different attribute values. Details
of the synthetic dataset including how it was generated and the resulting counts are given in Appendix B.
We then run the Noise Remover on each attribute value with different values of k (number of two-partitions).
The results are shown in Table 2. As an example, with k = 200, the probability that all 107 attribute values
are returned correctly is at least 0.959 (according to the analysis above, using a union bound). In practice
with k = 200 and k = 255 all attribute values are returned exactly without any error. We see that even with
k = 50 (which amounts to t = 2k = 100 queries to Bounded Noisy Counts per attribute value), we have only
a 7.48% of attribute values with an incorrect answer.
A few observations are in order: (a) First, even for the cases where the actual count returned is incorrect,
the level of noise is reduced (i.e., it is ±1 instead of ±2). (b) Secondly, in some cases the noise returned
is −1. By the properties of the algorithm, we can fix this to 0. This results in even less percentage of
erroneous attribute values: 3.74% error for k = 50 and 0.9% (only one incorrect guess) for k = 127. (c) A
final observation is that the probabilities reported in Figure 4 are for the entire column. If the target is only
one specific set of attribute values (corresponding to a target individual), then the probabilities are higher,
i.e., 0.9996 for the case of k = 200.
In Appendix C, we experimentally analyse the success probability of the Noise Remover by varying the
number of attribute values whose corresponding queries have non-zero outputs, and discuss some workarounds
when this number is low.
5.2 Adult Dataset
We also ran the attack on a real-world dataset. For this, we used the Adult dataset [10], which is an extract
from the 1994 US Census information.4 The dataset consists of 32,561 rows, each containing an individual’s
data. We extract the age column for the attack. This column contains all ages in the integer range [17..88]
and the age 90. We augment this by including ages 10 to 16 inclusive, age 89, and ages 91 to 120 inclusive,
each obviously having a count of 0. Thus, there are a total of 111 values for the age attribute to be queried
via the TBE API. The breakdown of true counts is as follows:
4More specifically, we use the adult.data file from https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult.
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Count (c) True Instances
c = 0 38
0 < c ≤ 4 (suppressed) 4
4 < c ≤ 100 16
100 < c ≤ 898 53
Total 111
We used the set of 10 attribute values A′ = {17, 18, . . . , 27} as the base set. All of the attribute in this set
have a true count of ≥ 395, and hence their noisy counts would not be suppressed by Bounded Noisy Counts
for any reasonable perturbation parameter value. We then used 1,000 two-partitions out of the possible
1, 023 two-partitions from A′ to find qA′ through the Noise Remover. We denote this query answer by n′.
Then for each age a /∈ A′ we create the set A′′ = A′ ∪ {a}, and use the Noise Remover with k two-partitions
to find the answer to qA′′ as n
′′. The answer to qa is then obtained as n′′ − n′. For an age a ∈ A′, we create
the set A′′ = A′ − {a}, and again use k two-partitions to find the answer to qA′′ via Noise Remover as n′′.
The answer to qa in this case is n
′ − n′′.
Notice that only for the base set do we use a total of 1,000 two-partitions, since this will be done only
once. The number k of two-partitions used to compute the answers to qA′′ for each A
′′ is from the set
{50, 100, 200, 250}. For each k, we run the experiment a total of 100 times. The average success rate is then
reported. For this experiment we use three different perturbation parameters: r = {2, 3, 5}. The results are
summarised in Table 3. We see that even with r = 5, the attack successfully recovers the true count of more
than 93% of attribute values with k = 250 two-partitions used per attribute value, i.e., t = 2k = 500 queries
per attribute value to Bounded Noisy Counts.
Table 3: Results of running Attack 2 to retrieve the age column of the Adult dataset against different
perturbation parameter values. Negative counts were ceiled to 0. For each k ∈ {50, 100, 200, 250} (number
of two-partitions) the average of 100 runs is reported.
Perturbation
Total
Total Correctly Retrieved
r k = 50 k = 100 k = 200 k = 250
±2 111 103.2 110.1 111.0 111.0
- 93.0% 99.2% 100.0% 100.0%
±3 111 89.8 103.9 110.0 110.8
- 80.9% 93.6% 99.1% 99.8%
±5 111 70.2 88.0 98.2 103.6
- 63.3% 79.3% 88.4% 93.4%
6 Some Inherent Limitations
The noise distribution for the TBE algorithm is required to maximise disclosure control subject to utility
constraints [26]. We call such a distribution, an admissible distribution. More precisely, given a finite set
of integer perturbation values Π, an admissible distribution E can be obtained by maximising the entropy
−∑e∈Π p(e) log2 p(e) subject to the constraints
1. It should be a probability distribution:
∑
e∈Π p(e) = 1.
2. It should be unbiased, i.e., E(E) = 0, where E is the random variable distributed as E .
3. It should have bounded variance, i.e., Var(E) ≤ v, for some threshold v.
These properties are stated in [26], except that we have excluded the condition that the noise values should
not be less than 0 or a positive value, as we expect this to be handled by the suppression parameter. The
method of Lagrange multipliers [5, p. 707] can be used to solve the above problem to find the distribution
E given the set Π [26].
We call E non-trivial if it is any distribution other than p(0) = 1. An immediate consequence of constraint
2 is that any non-trivial distribution requires the set Ω to have at least one negative and one positive integer.
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Also, if we let v ≥ r(r + 1)/3 in constraint 3, then given the set Π = Z±r, we get the discrete uniform
distribution U±r as the unique solution to the above optimisation problem (recall that r(r + 1)/3 is the
variance of the discrete uniform distribution U±r). This is the distribution that we have used in this
paper. Other admissible distributions include, the zero-mean truncated normal distribution, the zero-mean
truncated Laplace distirbution, and in general any truncated zero-mean symmetric distribution. Samples
from these distributions can be rounded to nearest integers to fall in the set Π.
A natural question to ask is whether any other admissible distribution makes the attack significantly
harder. The answer to this question is negative. The clue lies in Eq. 3. First, if we let v < r(r + 1)/3, then
the resulting distribution will have variance less than U±r, and through Eq. 3, the variance of the average of
t = 2k such variables will be less than its uniform counterpart, and as a result the attack requires fewer queries
(given by t) to remove noise. We can in fact derive the minimum condition required of the perturbation to
withstand the attack. First, from Section 4.2.1, we see that Var(Y ) = 1k2
∑k
i=1 Var(Yi) =
1
kVar(Y ), where Y
is the random variable denoting the sum of two random variables distributed as E , and k is the number of
two-partitions. The two being i.i.d., we get Var(Y ) = 2kVar(E), where E is distributed as E . Since E(E) = 0,
we have that
Var(E) =
∑
e∈Π
e2p(e) ≤
∑
e∈Π
c2p(e) = c2,
where c = max{|e| : e ∈ Π}, i.e., the maximum absolute perturbation. Thus, we get Var(Y ) ≤ 2c2k = 4c
2
t ,
where t = 2k is the number of queries to the Bounded Noisy Counts algorithm. Now, Eq. 3 shows that for
the attack to be unsuccessful, we should have Var(Y ) = Ω(1). Together with the previous result, this implies
that, we require
c = Ω(
√
t). (6)
Thus, the amount of perturbation needs to be of order
√
t to thwart the attack, where t equals the number
of queries. This result is consistent with the results from linear reconstruction attacks [9]. Incidentally,
this is also the level of noise required by any differentially private algorithm to answer t queries (without
coordinated answers to queries) [13, 31]. For instance, if the privacy budget  is a small constant, then
adding zero-mean Gaussian noise of standard deviation
√
t to each of the t queries satisfies concentrated
differential privacy [15]. Obviously, the noise is of scale O(
√
t). Likewise, to achieve the notion of (, δ)-
differential privacy, with a constant  and negligible δ, one can answer O(t) arbitrary counting queries with
noise of scale O(
√
t) via the Laplace mechanism using the advanced composition theorem [28],[31, Theorem
7.2.7]. A consequence of the above result is that any perturbation algorithm with bounded (constant) noise
is eventually expected to succumb to our noise removing attack.
7 Mitigation Measures
We briefly discuss possible mitigation measures against the two attacks separately.
7.1 Mitigation Measures against Perturbation Finder
Recall that the attack algorithm on finding the perturbation value relies on identifying an attribute with at
least two attribute values. Assume this to be the attribute gender, with attribute values male and female.
The attack involves submitting queries on the number of males, the number of females, and the combined
number of males and females (total query).
Query Auditing. A first defence mechanism is to audit queries to check if an analyst is attempting to
find the perturbation parameter. This measure needs to identify all possible query combinations that can be
used to narrow down the possible range (of the perturbation parameter). The specific construction of queries
(outlined above) in our attack is one possible way. However, there may exist other combination of queries
which could be used to find the perturbation parameter. This requires an exhaustive analysis. Furthermore,
it is difficult to detect if there is malicious intent behind a given series of queries, as they can be contextually
benign, e.g., an analyst might very well be checking the gender distribution across different occupations in
a geographic area. In general, query auditing is a difficult problem [14].
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Query Throttling. Another alternative is to throttle the number of queries. This can be done by introduc-
ing a “cap” on the number of queries allowed to an analyst. However, in light of our results, this would be
too small a number, e.g., not allowing more than 200 queries if r = 5 is used as the perturbation parameter.
Eliminating the Total Query. Recall that the attack algorithm works by examining the difference between
the noisy count of the total query versus the sum of noisy counts of the sub-queries. Thus one way to mitigate
the attack is to not add “fresh” noise to the total query (and instead report the sum of the noisy counts from
the sub-queries). Unfortunately, this significantly impacts utility. For instance, if an analyst is interested
in the number of people living in a certain geographic area (say the suburb Redfern), then the only way
to obtain this answer would be to add the answers obtained from the number of males and the number of
females living in the area. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there might be multiple
attributes with two attribute values under the same geographic area. And thus the attack can be (slightly)
modified to instead equate the sums obtained from multiple pairs of attribute values.
Disclosing the Perturbation Parameter. In light of the shortcomings of the above mentioned defence
measures, an inevitable choice is to make the perturbation parameter public. Apart from having a negligible
impact on (individual) privacy, this is beneficial from a utility point of view as well. The analyst now knows
the degree to which an answer is possibly perturbed, and can factor this amount into his/her calculations.
7.2 Mitigation Measures against Noise Remover
Recall that the attack on removing noise relies on creating two-partitions of a target attribute, and the fact
that fresh noise is added to the answers to the total queries from the two-partitions.
Query Auditing. Automated checks could be applied to see if a significant number of queries correspond to
different two-partitions of the same sub-population. Several issues make this a less than ideal solution. First,
malicious queries might not be successively submitted; a clever attacker might inject these queries in between
several innocuous queries. In general, query auditing can be computationally infeasible; indeed, it is NP-
Hard to detect maliciously crafted queries via query auditing [25]. In fact, the need to dispense with query
auditing is one of the motivations behind the rigorous definition of differential privacy [14]. Secondly, we
could modify the attack to include three-partitions instead of two-partitions (with a corresponding increase
in the number of queries required to remove noise). Lastly, while we have demonstrated one way in which
multiple answers can be combined together and averaged to remove noise, we have not checked and confirmed
whether there exist other query combinations which could do the same.
Query Throttling. Placing a cap on the allowed number of queries is another option, with the obvious
drawback that it limits the analyst to a much smaller number of queries. The attacks described in this
paper as well as prior work on reconstruction attacks [9] suggest that this is unavoidable if bounded noise
mechanisms are deemed indispensable. A technical difficulty is proposing a quantitative bound on the
number of queries allowed. For instance, our results show that even 100 queries remove the noise for most
attributes with a perturbation parameter of r = 2.
Eliminating the Total Query. The noise removing algorithm relies on the fact that answer to the total
query adds fresh noise, which can be compared against the sum of the noisy counts of queries corresponding
to the two-partitions. If the total query does not add fresh noise, the sum would be noisier and as a
result would require a larger number of queries to eliminate noise. However, as discussed before, this is not
desirable from a utility point of view. For instance, if the analyst wishes to know the number of people
in a sub-population with age greater than 50, then the only way to obtain this would be to add the result
obtained from each age grouping (and thus obtain a noisier answer). We do note that there are techniques
to construct differentially private histograms which maintain consistency [4, 23], with often the output being
much more accurate [23]. Here consistency, for instance, means that the noisy answer to the total query and
the total after summing the noisy counts of per-attribute value queries are the same. These approaches rely
on optimization via post-processing. For instance, one way to maintain consistency is to add noise to queries
on attribute value tuples from all the attributes in the dataset, and answer queries on fewer attributes from
these [4, §3.1]. Thus, there are better ways to answer the total query than the one outlined above.
Provably-Private Alternatives. Our attack is another example of a series of attacks demonstrating that
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extremely high accuracy cannot be guaranteed for too many queries due to privacy concerns. For instance,
prior results have shown that noise needs to be calibrated according to the number of queries to avoid
database reconstruction attacks [16, 9]. In Section 6, we showed that this is needed to prevent our attacks
as well. Thus, a safe way of releasing noisy answers is to scale the noise as a function of the number of
queries asked. Differential privacy [11, 14] is a privacy definition and framework that allows to do this.
The parameter  in differential privacy determines the noise added to query answers and can be tweaked
to find a balance between privacy and utility. Furthermore, this parameter can be safely disclosed without
effecting privacy. However, this suggests that answering too many queries will result in noise that badly
affects utility. This is an inherent limitation of any privacy-preserving mechanism. In particular, there is
growing amount of evidence (including this work) that suggests that any meaningful guarantee of privacy
cannot allow extremely accurate answers to an unlimited number of queries.
7.3 Lessons Learned
We summarise some of our recommendations:
• Parameters used in the privacy algorithms, e.g., the perturbation parameter, should not be kept secret.
It is easy to retrieve them if hidden, and, furthermore, disclosing them upfront is helpful for analysts.
• Ad hoc workarounds to mitigate averaging attacks, e.g., by adding same noise to same queries or same
contributors, only marginally impede them. At best they inform us where fresh noise should not be
wasted, e.g., if same query is repeated.
• Mitigating attacks with specific patches, e.g., eliminating the total query, may not prevent other ways
of carrying out these attacks.
• Adding fresh noise to query answers is not a privacy problem as long as the noise scale is a function of
the number of queries.
• Differential privacy provides a framework which allows to add noise to queries in a way that mitigates
averaging or other attacks. Often the scale of noise required is optimum in order to avoid privacy
catastrophes, e.g., reconstruction attacks.
8 Discussion
We reiterate that due to ethical reasons we did not demonstrate the attack on real census data, but rather
showed the vulnerability of the perturbation method by applying it on a synthetic dataset. Thus, the
actual TableBuilder tool is vulnerable to our attack and remains at risk from similar attacks. Notice that
even though the TableBuilder tool is not equipped with an API the attack could still be performed in an
automated way, e.g., one could use web-based scripts to query the tool.
We communicated the vulnerability to ABS. They acknowledged that the attack relates to TableBuilder.
In response, we were told that the ABS is bringing some upcoming changes to the TableBuilder tool. These
include applying user-specific cap on the number of queries (users will have to re-apply once their query
quota expires), only allowing highly aggregated data to TableBuilder Guest (which can be accessed without
registration), and monitoring/auditing of TableBuilder usage logs. We believe that a more controlled access
to TableBuilder is definitely a step in the right direction. For instance, only allowing access to trusted
users.5 As mentioned above, however, query capping/throttling and auditing are mitigation measures that
are difficult to implement and impose. It is not clear exactly how many queries are safe (if noise is not a
function of the number of queries), and as far as auditing is concerned, it is extremely difficult to determine
if a series of queries is launched to carry out an attack or not (our attack or others).
As we have demonstrated, our attack crucially retrieves low counts as well. Most importantly, it retrieves
counts of 1 (which are suppressed by the TBE algorithm). Extracting such “uniques” is linked to re-
identifying individuals. Some may argue that finding a unique is not the same as identifying a real person in
5One may wonder if the user is trusted, why, then, use a perturbation mechanism at all? One reason provided to us is that
the user may wish to publicly release information obtained from TableBuilder, e.g., a journalist. However, in such cases the
information that the user wishes to publish, and only this information, can always be “sanitised” before publication.
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the population exhibiting those attribute values. However, maintaining this flimsy distinction between the
two cases provides little solace; once uniques are identified, a little background information is enough to link
them to real persons in the population [29].
Finally, we would like to draw attention to a similar data usage scenario relating the United States (US)
Census Bureau who seek to publish some aggregated form of the 2020 Census of Population and Housing [22].
The Bureau has internally investigated the applicability of database reconstruction attacks [16, 9, 12, 24]
on the 2010 (aggregated) census data and has come to the conclusion that given the amount of information
leaked per person, there is a “theoretical possibility” that the census data could be reconstructed. We first
note that these reconstruction attacks are also applicable to noisy data (where noise is significantly less than
the amount of statistics released). Secondly, our averaging attack can also be seen as a form of reconstruction
attack, where the attacker can reconstruct target columns of the underlying dataset. Based on their findings,
Garfinkel, Abowd and Martindale [22] conclude:
Faced with the threat of database reconstruction, statistical agencies have two choices: they can
either publish dramatically less information or use some kind of noise injection. Agencies can use
differential privacy to determine the minimum amount of noise necessary to add, and the most
efficient way to add that noise, in order to achieve their privacy protection goals.
These recommendations for the US census data are inline with our suggestions for the Australian census
data.
9 Related Work
Our attacks are not the only attacks reported on the TBE algorithm. A differencing attack on the TBE
algorithm has been documented before, through which some information about a target individual can be
inferred [6, 27]. The attack essentially relies on some background knowledge. For instance, suppose that
we know that n out of n + 1 individuals in a particular group, identified by a vector of attributes b ∈ B,
satisfy a particular attribute value a ∈ A, where A /∈ B. Further assume that the (n+ 1)th individual, the
target, has the same background, i.e., takes on the values b, and we would like to know if the individual also
exhibits a ∈ A. By querying the TBE algorithm on b, and then b + a, we can tell if the individual does not
exhibit a if the two answers returned by the TBE algorithm are different. However, notice that this attack
is fundamentally different than our attacks. One major difference being that our averaging attack does not
rely on any background information about other individuals.
A somewhat similar attack that exploits the use of suppression is highlighted in [8]. Although the attack
is in relation to the application of a differentially private mechanism to release histograms of transport
data [3], it can also be applied to the TBE algorithm. For instance, suppose that the query answer qa1 is
larger than the suppression parameter, and the query answer qa2 is lower, for a1, a2 ∈ A, for some attribute
A. The TBE algorithm will return a noisy count for qa1 and 0 for qa2 . However, the query answer qa1 ∧ qa2
is higher than the suppression parameter. If the answer returned by TBE is different than qa1 , then the
analyst learns that qa2 is not zero. Indeed, this is the observation used by us in Section 4.2.2.
As noted before, there is a specific class of attacks known as linear reconstruction attacks that seeks
to reconstruct a whole (target) column of a sensitive dataset [16, 9, 12, 24] based on linear programming.
Algorithms that allow overly accurate answers to too many linear queries are susceptible to these attacks.
More precisely, algorithms which return noisy answers with noise bounded within o(
√
n), where n is the
number of rows (individuals) in the dataset, succumb to these attacks. However, it is not clear how linear
reconstruction attacks can be applied to the TBE algorithm due to the restricted query interface. Linear
reconstruction attacks use random subset sum queries which requires the ability to query random subsets of
rows of the underlying dataset [7]. The restricted interface in TBE does not allow such queries.
Diffix [17, 18] is another disclosure control mechanism that is built on some principles similar to TBE. In
particular, Diffix also uses the concept of sticky noise, e.g., same query, same answer. However, the authors
in [17] note that a naive application of sticky noise is susceptible to a split averaging attack. The attack is
similar to our attack: ask queries on attribute values and their negations (e.g., a and NOT a), and then
average over multiple attribute values. Due to this and other attacks, Diffix uses the idea of layered sticky
noise, using a combination of static noise (depending on the query conditions, e.g., gender being female)
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and dynamic noise depending on both the query conditions and the set of contributors [17, 18]. We note
that the split averaging attack is different from our attack, as the TBE interface does not accept negated
queries. We instead need to rely on two-partitions and the use of the total query. Furthermore, we give
a detailed analysis on success probabilities as a function of the number of attribute values with non-zero
counts returned by the algorithm.
Interestingly, Diffix circumvents our proposed attack by including per query condition sticky noise. For
instance, assume the attacker wants to know the exact answer to qb ∧ qA, where b is an attribute value of
some attribute B, and A is the target attribute. Let {A1, A2} be a two-partition of A. Then the noise added
to qb ∧ qA1 and qb ∧ qA2 has a noise component added due to the contributors of the two queries, plus noise
added due to the conditions qb, qA1 , and qA2 . The noise added to the last two changes per two-partition
and hence can be averaged out, but qb remains “sticky.” Hence the result of the averaging attack will not
average this noise term out. The obvious drawback is that more noise is added per query. More details of
the multi-layer noise in Diffix is given in [17, §5.2].
Gadotti et al. [21] propose a different averaging attack on Diffix, which circumvents the layered sticky
noise by first removing the static noise component and then uses averaging to distinguish between two
probability distributions, one with the sensitive attribute set to 1 and the other where it is set to 0. The
attack relies on knowing whether the target record is unique in the dataset, which is likely to be true for
a significant fraction of records in the dataset [21]. A more involved attack, called cloning attack, uses
“dummy” conditions in queries to obtain the same set of contributors [21]. However this attack relies on the
richness of the query language.
There are also reconstruction attacks reported on Diffix [7], which rely on the ability to select random
“enough” rows from the underlying dataset by exploiting the rich query interface of Diffix. In the most
recent version of Diffix, the attack has been seemingly mitigated by restricting queries that would isolate
individuals in the dataset [21, 1]. As mentioned before, the TableBuilder interface is highly restrictive, and
it is not clear how such reconstruction attacks could be carried out on the TBE algorithm.
10 Conclusion
We have shown an averaging attack that retrieves actual values exhibited by an attribute (or one or more
of its attribute values) in a dataset which can only be accessed via a privacy-preserving algorithm that adds
bounded uniform noise to the answers. In line with previous research on linear reconstruction attacks (see
e.g., [16]), we show that if the number of allowed queries are above a given mark, the algorithm fails to
provide privacy. We have demonstrated the attack on a synthetic dataset accessed via the TBE algorithm
used for the ABS TableBuilder. While the TBE algorithm might be patched to resist the particular attack
mentioned in this paper, we would like to stress that this may not be the only attack possible. A better
alternative is to scale noise according to the number of queries allowed to minimise information leakage from
a theoretical point of view [9]. This will guarantee that privacy is maintained in practice. We also restate
that we have only considered one subset of queries (counting queries), and the attack may be applicable to
other types of queries, e.g., range queries on continuous data.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let e be the noise added by M. (a) First assume n > s. Then since e ∈ [−r, r], α = n+ e ≥ n− r ≥
n− s > 0. Here we have used the fact that s ≥ r. If n ≤ s, then α = 0 (step 2 of the algorithm). (b) Again,
first assume n > s. Then n − r ≤ α ≤ n + r ⇒ n − s ≤ α ≤ n + r. Now, if n ≤ s, then α = 0. Trivially,
n − s ≤ 0 = α. (c) If C(q) is empty, then |C(q)| = 0 < s, and hence M should always return a 0 in this
case.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Since n1 and n2 are both greater than r, the noisy answers returned by Bounded Noisy Counts are
non-zero. Furthermore, since n1, n2 > r > 0, we see that {C(qb ∧ qa1), C(qb ∧ qa2)} is a partition of C(qb).
Hence, the two have necessarily different contributors: C(qb ∧ qa1) 6= C(qb ∧ qa2). Therefore, Bounded
Noisy Counts adds independent noise to the corresponding queries. Furthermore, C(qb) 6= C(qb ∧ qa1) and
C(qb) 6= C(qb ∧ qa2), since the cardinality of both are greater than r, and hence cannot be equal to the total.
Therefore, there is independent noise added to n as well.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Assume the contrapositive for some i and j. Then since C(qbi) = C(qbj ), the Bounded Noisy Counts
algorithm should add the same noise to qbi and qbj , and hence M(qbi) =M(qbj ); a contradiction.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First let us consider the number of permutations whose sum is greater than 3(r− 1). Note that none
of the Ei’s can be less than r − 3. To see this, note that if r = 1, then any of the Ei’s cannot be equal to
r− 3 = −2. Let us assume that r > 1, then if any of the Ei’s is ≤ r− 3, then the maximum possible sum is
≤ r− 3 + r+ r = 3(r− 1), which is our threshold. Thus, we enumerate all possible permutation of values of
the Ei’s, such that Ei ≥ r − 2 and E1 + E2 + E3 > 3(r − 1). This is shown below.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From Lemma 3, there are exactly 20 possible values of the tuple (z1, z2, z3), for which z in step 4 of
the algorithm has sum greater than 3(r − 1) or less than −3(r − 1).6 Through Lemma 1 the variables zi
are i.i.d. The probability that z for the ith set of queries to the Attribute Analyzer is within the interval
[−3(r − 1), 3(r − 1)] is given by 1− 20/(2r + 1)3. The result follows for all m attributes, since the ith z in
step 4 is independently distributed due to Lemma 2.
E1 E2 E3
r r r
r r r − 1
r r r − 2
r r − 1 r
r r − 1 r − 1
r r − 2 r
r − 1 r r
r − 1 r r − 1
r − 1 r − 1 r
r − 2 r r
There are exactly 10 such values. By symmetry, the same holds for E1 + E2 + E3 < −3(r − 1).
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. There are 2m elements in the power set of A. Out of these, two are ∅ and A itself. Out of the
remaining 2m − 2 elements (subsets of A), we can construct a two-partition by choosing any element as the
first subset, say A′, and A−A′ as the other subset. Since A−A′ is also in the power set, we have counted
each two-partition twice. Thus, dividing 2m − 2 by 2 gives us the result.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Let S = A′∆A′′.7 Then, since A′ 6= A′′, S 6= ∅. Also, since M(qb ∧ qai) 6= 0 for all i ∈ [m], it follows
from Proposition 1, that C(qb ∧ qA′) and C(qb ∧ qA′′) are non-empty sets. Now, assume to the contrary
that C(qb ∧ qA′) = C(qb ∧ qA′′). Since any contributor (user) can have only one attribute value in A, it
must follow that for this contributor to be in both sets of contributors, the attribute value should be in the
intersection of both A′ and A′′. Since the two sets of contributors are equal, this means that any attribute
value a /∈ A′ ∩ A′′ = S is not taken by any contributor. Therefore, (qb ∧ qa)(D) = 0, for all a ∈ S, which
means that Bounded Noisy Counts outputs M(qb ∧ qa) = 0. But this contradicts the assumption.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Fix an i. The the two error variables E
(i)
1 and E
(i)
2 are noise terms added to the two sets of the
corresponding two-partitions. Since by assumption all counts from Bounded Noisy Counts are non-zero, the
queries corresponding to the two sets have non-zero set of contributors (Proposition 1). Since the two queries
are on disjoint partitions, they also have different contributors (in fact, mutually exclusive). Therefore, the
Bounded Noisy Counts algorithm adds independent noise with distribution U±r. Now consider, Z1, . . . , Zk.
6Note that even though the lemma applies to the sum z1 + z2 + z3, it is easy to see that it also holds true for z1 + z2 − z3.
7For any two sets A and B, A∆B denotes their symmetric difference.
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By Lemma 5 the query corresponding to every set in the set of two-partitions PA has different contributors.
Hence E
(i)
j are i.i.d. with distribution U±r, where j ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [k]. The result follows.
A.1 Lower Bound on the Success Probability of Noise Remover
It is easy to see that E(E(i)j ) = 0. And by the variance of the discrete uniform distribution
Var(E
(i)
j ) =
(r − (−r) + 1)2 − 1
12
=
r(r + 1)
3
.
By the linearity of expectation
E(Yi) = 0,
and by Lemma 6,
Var(Yi) =
2r(r + 1)
3
.
Again through linearity of expectation
E(Y ) = 0,
and by Lemma 6,
Var(Y ) =
1
k2
k∑
i=1
2r(r + 1)
3
=
2
3
r(r + 1)
k
.
Using Chebyshev’s inequality, we see that
Pr
(∣∣Y − E(Y )∣∣ ≥ ) ≤ Var(Y )
2
.
By setting  = 0.5, and putting in the values of E(Y ) and Var(Y ), we get
Pr
(∣∣Y ∣∣ ≥ 0.5) ≤ 8
3
r(r + 1)
k
.
Thus,
Pr
(∣∣Y ∣∣ < 0.5) ≥ 1− 8r(r + 1)
3(2m−1 − 1) .
A.2 Exact Success Probability of Noise Remover
Let X1 = E1, and define Xi = Xi−1 + Ei, for i ∈ {2, . . . , 2k}. Then the probability mass function of X2 is
given by
fX2(x) =
+∞∑
y=−∞
fX1(y)fE(x− y) =
+∞∑
y=−∞
fE(y)fE(x− y),
and for every i
fXi(x) =
+∞∑
y=−∞
fXi−1(y)fE(y − x).
Thus, we can iteratively find fX2k , the probability mass function of X2k. Now,
Pr
(∣∣Y ∣∣ < 0.5) = Pr(∣∣∣∣X2kk
∣∣∣∣ < 0.5)
= Pr
(
−1
2
<
X2k
k
<
1
2
)
= Pr
(
−k
2
< X2k <
k
2
)
=
∑
x∈(−k/2,k/2)
fX2k(x).
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B Synthetic Data Details
Table 4: The distribution of counts in the target column in the synthetic dataset against each attribute
value a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 107}. “Counts” represents true counts, and “TBE” represents noisy counts from the
TBE algorithm with parameter r = 2.
a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Counts 1 3 6 12 33 53 114 199 372 677 1075 1837 2884 4388 6496 9136 12694 16893 21513 26566
TBE 0 0 6 12 34 52 116 197 373 678 1074 1838 2883 4389 6495 9137 12692 16892 21515 26564
a 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Counts 31854 36741 40268 43426 44865 44812 43054 40259 35698 31534 26103 20953 16539 12430 8977 6297 4283 2715 1775 1085
TBE 31853 36739 40267 43427 44867 44813 43053 40258 35696 31532 26105 20955 16537 12431 8975 6296 4284 2713 1774 1084
a 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52-107
Counts 614 377 196 93 53 24 14 3 4 1 1 0
TBE 615 378 195 95 52 25 15 0 0 0 0 0
The synthetic dataset used in our experimental evaluation in Section 5 was generated by first fixing
n = 600, 000 rows. Next we generated n normally distributed samples with mean 25 and standard deviation
5. The resulting samples were then binned into their nearest integer bins labelled 1 to 51. We assumed an
attribute A with 107 different attribute values. We assigned the counts in the bins 1 to 51 to the attribute
values a = 1 to 51, respectively. Attribute values 52 to 107 were fixed at 0. For our attack evaluation, we
only used this one column, where the counts are normally distributed. Table 4 shows the counts in the target
column used in our experimental evaluation together with the noisy counts retrieved via the TBE algorithm
with perturbation parameter r = 2.
C Constraints on the Dataset
The Noise Remover algorithm requires a minimum number of attribute values with non-zero counts returned
by the Bounded Noisy Counts for a given probability of success. Abusing terminology, we call them attribute
values with non-zero outputs. For an attribute A with m attribute values with non-zero outputs, the proba-
bility of successfully determining the query answer qA can be determined via Eq. 5. Recall that m attribute
values with non-zero outputs enables k = 2m−1−1 two-partitions (cf. Section 4.2.2). The higher the number
of two-partitions available, the closer we get to the true answer as a function of the number of queries t ≤ 2k
to Bounded Noisy Counts. We are interested in evaluating the success probability when m is small. To do
this, we ran an experiment where we vary the number of attribute values of an attribute A with non-zero
outputs from 2 to 11. Then for each m, we run the Noise Remover with all the k = 2m−1− 1 two-partitions,
and obtain the result as the guess for qA. We ran the experiment 10,000 times for each perturbation pa-
rameter r in the range 2 to 10. The results are shown in Figure 5. Note that m = 2 means that we have
only 1 two-partition. In this case, the noise remover’s success rate is simply 1/(2r + 1), the probability of
guessing the true answer. For small parameters, r ≤ 5, we need 9 attribute values with non-zero outputs for
the attack to be successful with more than 90 percent success rate. This reaches to 11 for the perturbation
parameter r = 10.
However, there are several workarounds when we have less than the ideal number of attribute values with
non-zero outputs. We discuss two of them. First, we note that the attack can still be launched if we have only
two attribute values with non-zero outputs. Let us assume the attribute A = {a1, a2, e1, . . . , em}. Assume
that the queries on attribute values a1 and a2 have non-zero outputs. Further assume that the answers to
the queries qei , for i ∈ [m], is zero from Bounded Noisy Counts, but they have non-empty contributors. We
denote this subset by A′. Then, first we can compute 2m−1 − 1 two-partitions of A′. In each partition, we
add a1 to the first set and a2 to the second set. Then it is easy to see that the resulting 2
m−1 − 1 partitions
can be used to launch the noisy removing attack, as the corresponding query answers will not be suppressed
and will have fresh noise added. Of course, for this to work we need to confirm if the true answers to the
qei ’s are indeed non-zero. This can be done by using a = a1 or a = a2 and obtaining answers to qa and
qa ∧ qei . If the two noisy answers are different, then necessarily C(qei) is non-empty. The probability that
the answer would be different is given by 1− (2r + 1)−2.
Second, the attack can still be launched by adding/removing attribute values from other attributes. For
instance, if we are interested in knowing qa for some attribute a ∈ A, and we have another attribute B, with
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Figure 5: Probability of successfully retrieving the count of the query qA(D) of an attribute A with m
different attribute values a1, . . . , am such that the answers returned by Bounded Noisy Counts is non-zero
for all qai .
m attribute values with non-zero outputs, we can create two-partitions of B. Then for each two-partition
{B′, B′′}, we can sum the noisy query answers qa ∧ qB′ and qa ∧ qB′′ .
Thus, while a minimum number of attribute values with non-zero outputs in the target attribute makes
the attack simpler, there are other ways to carry out the attack. This means that the attack cannot be
rendered ineffective simply because the target attribute has a low number of attribute values with non-zero
outputs.
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